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Scientific medicine rightly and understandably depends upon
making precise diagnoses . For each diagnosis, there is a name or labeL
Labeling a person in the sense of identifying and categorizing a
symptom or disease does not usually strike us as improper or unjust.
But medical labels, despite their necessity and usefulness, may be
unjustly as well as justly used. In this essay I want to examine certain
injustices connected with the concept or label "mental retardation ."
In Ralph Potter's excellent essay, "Labeling the Mentally Retarded:
The Just Allocation of Therapy," certain criteria were developed by
which to judge the justice of the way in which labels are applied . 1
Potter argued that the just use of labels in medicine for therapeutic
purposes should satisfy the following three criteria. First, no label
should be indelible. Any label that is applied to persons should be
erasable. Second, labels should establish eligibility for special assistance provided for persons with specific needs. This means that labels
should expand opportunities for the persons to whom they are
applied. Labels which contract opportunities constitute an ethically
unjustified use of power over others. Potter's third criterion is that
labels should confirm the treatment of persons as persons. In other
words, when one identifies a weakness in a person, this should not
prejudice one's expectations concerning the presence of a wide range
of valuable human qualities in that person. Applying Potter's criteria is
very revealing for seeing the differences and the actual practices surrounding a diagnosis like appendicitis as compared to a diagnosis of
mental retardation.
Indelibility
With respect to indelibility, appendicitis is not morally problematic.
It is certainly a temporary label. Furthermore, there is no stigma
attached to it, at least none that is permanent. Persons who are labeled
mentally retarded, on the other hand, tend to carry this label throughMay, 1978
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out their lives, and almost always for a very long time. One indication
of the expected irreversibility of mental retardation has been the
strong tendency to wish to sterilize young, mentally retarded women.
Although this tendency has abated, persons considered mentally
retarded still risk being sterilized with or without their consent.
Persons who have at some point in their lives been designated as
mentally retarded have great difficulty in shaking off this label. Even
the most loving and well-intentioned persons will often marvel at what
a retarded person can accomplish rather than think about the fact that
certain accomplishments on the part of a person once thought of as
mentally retarded should lead to the withdrawal of the label of mental
retardation. This persistence in using the label of mental retardation
for persons who are doing many of the things taken for granted of
"normals" is extremely unfair.
Special Assistance
When a person is diagnosed by a duly licensed physician as having
appendicitis, one can usually expect that such a person will receive
subsequent care and the removal of the symptoms associated with the
label. All of us are aware , of course, that there are potential and actual
injustices that may be associated with someone who is said to have
appendicitis. Unnecessary operations and discrimination in the delivery of health care are examples of problems of justice that the larger
society must constantly struggle to rectify. Nonetheless, our point
here is that the label of appendicitis as such is not a source of abuse.
By itself, then, being told that one has appenoicitis does not involve
a contraction of any basic human rights. On balance, it is a great gain
to be diagnosed as having appendicitis when one indeed is suffering
from it, because it means that one's right to live and pursue happiness
will have been enhanced by speedy, therapeutic intervention .
Special assistance in the case of mental retardation is, at best,
uneven. Indeed, it is not often possible to do something genuinely
therapeutic. For example, an underlying condition of Down's syndrome, which includes mental retardation, is not something that is at
the present time reversible. What is all too often overlooked, or at any
rate inadequately dealt with, is the fact that the person who has
Down's may, in many instances, still be helped to overcome some of
the incapacities associated with mental retardation. Our record relative
to providing special assistance for the mentally retarded is not at all on
a par with our record relative to appendicitis.
The worst aspect of the label of mental retardation is, however, the
devastating extent to which persons bearing that label may lose their
most fundamental rights. We have already alluded to sterilization, and
the reader of this issue of the Linacre Quarterly can see in Richard
Sherlock's essay a number of ways in which the mentally retarded
have not been afforded their full rights as human beings by court
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decisions. Harold Vanderpool's essay in this same issue calls attention
to a whole system of thought and orientation which is being applied
toward retarded individuals in various institutions for the retarded on
the basis of B. F. Skinner's ethical reasoning. Calling persons retarded
permits Skinner to speak of them as a detriment to the struggle for the
survival of the human species. He thinks that retarded persons are
virtually of no worth to the human species unless they are used in
experiments that will teach us how better to survive. Those who have
read the articles by Shaw 2 and by Duff and Carnpbell 3 will know also
that newly-born infants who are considered to be mentally retarded
may, with the cooperation of parents, lose the usual right to receive
life-saving medical interventions. In short, to be labeled mentally
retarded may, in some instances, mean the loss of so fundamental a
right as the right to life. Clearly, mental retardation carries with it
associations that appendicitis never does.
Treating Persons as Persons
Again, appendicitis is not a problem with respect to losing one's
identity and dignity as a person. In fact, it is an excellent label in this
regard because it functions precisely to relieve people temporarily of
their usual responsibilities and to hold them guiltless with respect to
any loss of productivity or inconveniences entailed by their medical
condition. The effect of being ill with appendicitis, as with many
other cases of illness, is to be given special deference as a person.
Mental retardation poses a real threat to persons. Actually it poses
the ultimate threat. Persons so designated may not be regarded as
persons at all. Joseph Fletcher has written that a Down's is not a
person. 4 In subsequent pUblications he has spelled out specific criteria
of personhood which include the achievement of a certain IQ leve1. 5 If
mental retardation is to connote a complete lack of personhood, it not
only loses whatever therapeutic value it still retains, but it also
becomes a sentence of death, or at the very least, a sentence to second-class citizenship.
There may be some question in the minds of readers about the
comparability of appendicitis and mental retardation as medical labels.
After all, appendicitis is clearly an acute condition and mental retardation is often associated with conditions such as Down's syndrome
which are irreversible or chronic. This is true. However, justice in the
use of mental retardation as a medical diagnosis and label requires us
to be guided by two important additional facts: first, that a great
number of mentally handicapped individuals can be helped to improve
their level of performance and functioning, and second, that some
individuals who have been described as mentally retarded will achieve
a state of independence that makes it inappropriate and unnecessary
to continue calling them retarded . Indeed, what we are contending is
that it is not just to label persons mentally retarded if the use of the
May, 1978
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label does not serve to provide them with help , and if the label is not
erased even though the condition that justified its use has been
improved to the point where help is no longer needed.
Having contrasted appendicitis and mental retardation as diagnostic
labels, some of the readers may understandably ask about other diagnostic labels that may involve injustices. Physicians, for example, have
long been uneasy about the extent to which and the way in which
diagnoses of cancer or of heart disease are to be communicated to
persons with the relevant medical symptoms. Our purpose here in
introducing criteria for judging the just use of diagnostic labels is to
provide a reminder to those who use medical labels of their potential
for abuse and a way of identifying what constitutes abuse in labeling.
There is no attempt here to argue that people who have symptoms
associated with what is called mental retardation will be greatly helped
if other words are substituted for their particular condition or handicap. No, this essay is not about what words or diagnostic labels to use,
but rather has to do with identifying and illustrating criteria by which
abuses in applying diagnostic labels can be identified and hopefully
curbed. It is a plea for more justice for those who are considered
mentally retarded.
Perhaps a further word is in order about the basis we have for
thinking about even the most severely retarded human beings as persons. There are at least three ways in which people decide questions of
personhood: 1) utilitarian, 2) rationalistic, and 3) Good Samaritan.
The utilitarian ideal of personhood would decide that human beings
qualify as persons depending upon how useful or productive they
are. Sometimes this will include the usefulness that is associated with
even limited forms of expressing affection, but sometimes it does not.
In The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn devastatingly documents the
complete loss of human rights and personhood that were associated
with the seemingly simple and innocent formula of the earliest chief
prosecutor of this new Soviet-socialist government. For Krylenko,
justice was decided on the basis of what was expedient for the state.
Krylenko also used the argument that is part of the basic utilitarian
formula, namely, the greatest good for the greatest number. The decisions of the court were always made in the name of the masses, of the
great majority. But no basic human rights are secure under this formula. If the rights to life and liberty are not strictly equal, justice has
been undermined. And fairness, whether in the courts or in medicine,
will not be the norm.
People may have a rationalistic ideal of personhood. Socrates is
reputed to have said that the unexamined life is not worth living. John
Stuart Mill thought it better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than an
animal satisfied. In both these instances, the basic right to life seems
to be questioned in instances where a certain measure of intellectual
attainment is impossible or not forthcoming. In any event, a certain
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intolerance for imperfection of the intellect is a long-standing part of
Western tradition and a basis on which some human beings are judged
as to their worthiness to be designated as persons and treated
accordingly.
If every member of society and everyone born into the human
species is to enjoy an equal right to life and liberty, nothing less than
the Good Samaritan ideal of personhood will be necessary. What this
ideal requires is that the community be pledged to a constraint against
killing, the exceptions to which cannot be justified on the basis of
criteria of personhood based on utility, reason, or other considerations
of merit. To be conceived and to be born of human parents is sufficient reason to be afforded the usual care and solicitousness which
we constantly bestow upon persons. There may be many difficult
decisions and conflicts that arise from the satisfaction of our basic
human rights, but our resolution of these will be unjust if it is based
on considerations of usefulness or rational ability.
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